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CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS IN NEVADA
In 1971 the Nevada legislature passed an act relating to the right
of contribution among joint tortfeasors. 1 With its adoption, Nevada
joins other jurisdictions which have abandoned the common law rule prohibiting contribution.2
It has been suggested that the stimulus for its passage was provided
by the case of Ponderosa Timber & Cledring Co. v. Emrich,3 decided
in 1970 by the Nevada Supreme Court. The decision in Emrich exemplified the inequitable situation which can result in a jurisdiction
which forbids contribution. In this case a collusive settlement agreement between plaintiff and one of two joint tortfeasors resulted in
the nonsettling tortfeasor having to satisfy the entire judgment.4 Without any right of contribution, the nonsettling tortfeasor had no remedy
against his collusive co-defendants. 5
The new contribution legislation will have a striking effect on several facets of Nevada tort law. First, the contribution act will substantially affect the law of releases. The release of one joint tortfeasor
no longer releases all others jointly and severally liable unless the "release so provides." 6 This is a modification of existing Nevada law on
releases formerly controlled by the Uniform Joint Obligations Act as
adopted by the legislature. 7 Under the obligation act, the release
of one joint tortfeasor automatically releases all others unless there is
an express reservation of rights by the plaintiff against the nonsettling defendants.' Second, section 4(2) of the new contributions act specifies
that certain conditions precedent must be satisfied before a settling
tortfeasor can be protected from a subsequent contribution claim. The
1. NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 17.210-.300 (Supp. 1971).
Contribution Act].
2.

[hereinafter cited as the

The leading case of Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799)

has long been cited for the common law proposition disallowing contribution.
rule has continued to find strong roots in the United States.

This

See, e.g., Union Stock

Yards Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905); Riexinger v. Ashton Co.,
9 Ariz. App. 406, 453 P.2d 235 (1969); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Chapman, 167 Ore.
661, 120 P.2d 223 (1941). Presently, two-thirds of the states allow some form of
contribution. W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS 306-07 (4th ed. 1971).
3. 86 Nev. 625, 472 P.2d 358 (1970).
4. Id. at 627, 472 P.2d at 359.
5. Id. at 628, 472 P.2d at 360.
6. NEV.REV.STAT. § 17.230(1) (1971).
7. Id. §§ 101.020-.090 (1971) [hereinafter cited as the Obligations Act].
8. See note 60 & accompanying text infra.
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conditions include the insertion of a clause in the settlement agreement
which specifically provides that the nonsettling tortfeasor need satisfy
only his pro rata share of the damages.' As will be noted, the requirements of section 4(2) have proven to be unworkable in other jurisdictions.1 0
Third, the new legislation introduced the concept of "relative
degree of fault" into Nevada tort law." Its application is restricted to
the liability of tortfeasors to one another and does not extend to the liability of a tortfeasor to an injured claimant.'" Though striving for equity,
Nevada may have incurred some unbargained for problems. Out-of-court
settlements will be made even more difficult since the plaintiff may
not always be able to determine what he is giving up when he releases
one of two joint tortfeasors.'3
Finally, though a tortfeasor is released by both the plaintiff and
a third party joint tortfeasor, he may still be joined by the nonsettling
defendant in an action brought by the injured party. 4 Joinder could
be crucially important to the potentially liable defendant to prove that
the settling defendant actually is a joint tortfeasor. This proof may be
necessary in order for the nonsettling defendant to retain his rights to
contribution or to have the plaintiff's damages reduced by the settling defendant's share of the liability.' 5
No Nevada cases have yet been decided on the basis of the new contribution act. It is therefore important to examine cases in jurisdictions
which have adopted similar provisions to predict the prospective effect of the new Nevada statute.
Release
At common law the release of one tortfeasor effected the release
of all other tortfeasors acting in concert with him.' 6 Under this rule,
all tortfeasors joined in an action by virtue of concurrent or concerted
acts were released by the release of any one joint tortfeasor. 1 7 Nevada
modified this harsh rule by the passage of the Uniform Joint Obli9.
10.

See note 66 & accompanying text infra.
See note 80 & accompanying text infra.
NEV. RFv.STAT. § 17.280(2) (1971).

11.
12. Id.
13. See text accompanying note 107 infra.
14. Davis v. Miller, 385 Pa. 348, 123 A.2d 422 (1956). See text accompanying
notes 115-23 infra.
15. See text accompanying note 120 infra.
16. Duck v. Mayeu, [1892] 2 Q.B. 511.
17. See, e.g., Cox v. Pearl Inv. Co., 168 Colo. 67, 450 P.2d 60 (1969);
Manthei v. Heimerdinger, 332 Ill. App. 335, 75 N.E.2d 132 (1947); Fleming v. Dane,
298 Mass. 216, 10 N.E.2d 85 (1937). But see Cranford v. McNiece, 252 Ore. 446,
450 P.2d 529 (1969).
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gations Act in 1927.18 This statute has been the subject of extensive
criticism, however, and at least one Nevada writer has called for its
repeal. 19
Under the obligations act, the effective release of one tortfeasor
results in the release of all others jointly and severally liable unless there
is an express reservation of right.2 ° This view became the holding in
Whittlesea v. Farmer.2' The Nevada Supreme Court, in Whittlesea,
considered the issue of whether the settlement agreement constituted a
release or covenant not to execute. The court held that if construed
as a release-and not a covenant not to execute-the agreement would
extinguish the plaintiff's cause of action against the remaining tortfeasor under the obligations act.2 2 The same interpretation of the 1927
act was similarly adopted by a federal district court construing New
York's modification of the obligations act. In Western Newspaper
Union v. Woodward23 the court decided that
[t]here appears to be no doubt . . . that when a general release, without express reservation of rights against others, is given
to one of several joint tortfeasors on a legal claim, or action at
law, for an unliquidated sum of money, the legal effect is to
work a full satisfaction
of the claim, and, hence, a discharge of all
24
the joint tortfeasors.

Release Under New Contribution Act

Section 4(1) of the Nevada contribution act provides that "Itihe
release of one joint tortfeasor by the injured person, whether before or
after judgement, does not discharge the other joint tortfeasors unless
the release so provides .... ,,2" This provision was adopted from
the 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. 26 Its purpose, according to the commissioners of the act who were responsible
for its creation, was to alter the harsh common law rule under which a
18.
19.
20.

NEv. REV. STAT. §§

101.020-.090 (1971).

18 N.v.ST.BAR J.122 (1953).
Melo v.National Fuse & Powder Co., 267 F. Supp. 611 (D. Colo. 1967)

(construing Utah law); Lejeune v. Midwestern Ins. Co., 98 F. Supp. 863 (W.D. La.
1951), appeal dismissed, 197 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1952); Guarisco v. Pennsylvania
Cas. Co., 20 So. 2d 35 (La. App. 1944) rev'd on other grounds, 209 La. 435, 24 So.

2d 678 (1945). The provisions of the obligations act apply to tort actions by virtue
of section 101.020.
21.
22.
that had
any third
23.

86 Nev. 347, 469 P.2d 57 (1970).
Id. at 349, 469 P.2d at 58. The decision would seem to conclude, a fortiori,
the agreement been a release, the plaintiff would have lost his rights against
party who was jointly and severally liable.
133 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Mo. 1955).

24. Id. at 25.
25. Nv.REV. STAT. § 17.230(1) (1971).
26. 9

UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 233

(1957).
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release to one or more joint tortfeasors automatically released all
others.27 The commissioners' intent has been recognized by judicial
decision. 28 In Brown v. City of Pittsburgh,29 a Pennsylvania action by
a pedestrian and her husband against the city of Pittsburgh and a
church for injuries sustained when plaintiff fell on a sidewalk, the court
determined that the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act . . drastically
changed the law on this subject [of releases] and since that enactment a release by the injured party to one jointly liable does
not release
others also liable, unless the release expressly so
80
provides.
Section 4(1) of the Nevada contribution act, adopted from the basic
contribution act interpreted in Brown, seems to rectify the problem
faced by an injured person seeking settlement with one tortfeasor but
fearful of forfeiting his causes of action against other nonsettling defendants.
The contribution act also renders unimportant the difference between a covenant not to sue (or execute) and a release. Under the obligations act, the courts' determination of whether an agreement was a
covenant or a release was critical in determining whether a plaintiff
had forfeited his cause of action against the nonsettling tortfeasor. 31
A covenant under the obligations act preserves plaintiff's rights against
a nonsettling defendant, while a release effects a general discharge of
all those actually and potentially liable for the injury."
Accordingly,
prior to passage of the new contribution act, the Nevada courts had
generally taken the view that it is important to make the covenant
versus release determination.
In Hansen v. Collett,3 3 for example, an action was brought for medical malpractice. The Nevada Supreme Court, in construing an agreement between plaintiff and one defendant, held that the agreement was
a release by its very terms.3 4 The tendency of the courts to be guided
by the express terms of an agreement, rather than the parties' intent,
27. Id. at 242 (Commissioners' Note).
28. E.g., Orange v. Schnupp, 50 W.BJ. 131, 134 (Westmoreland Co. Pa., Ct.
C.P. 1968).
29. 409 Pa. 357, 186 A.2d 399 (1962).
30. Id. at 362, 186 A.2d at 402; accord, Swigert v. Welk, 213 Md. 613, 133
A.2d 428 (1957) (dictum); Rio Grande Gas Co. v. Stahmann Farms, Inc., 80 N.M.
432, 457 P.2d 364 (1969); Smith v. Raparot, 101 R.I. 565, 225 A.2d 666 (1967)
(release of servant not release of master).
31. See note 22 & accompanying text supra.
32. Western Newspaper Union v. Woodward, 133 F. Supp. 17, 25 (W.D. Mo.

1955).
33.
34.

79 Nev. 159, 380 P.2d 301 (1963).
Id. at 162, 380 P.2d at 302.
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was also followed in Whittlesea v. Farmer." In that decision the
court determined that "[i]n some cases covenants are construed to be
releases because the words used suggest that result."3 6 The majority opinion, however, provoked a sound rebuttal by Justice Zenoff. In a concurring opinion he concluded that the intent of the parties should be a
more conclusive factor than the actual terms used in the agreement: 37
38
"[it is the purpose [of the agreement] that counts, not the name tag.
Regardless of how the Nevada courts interpret an instrument under the obligations act, the distinction between a covenant and a release
is of no importance under the contribution act. The language of section 4(1) protects a plaintiff from inadvertently forfeiting his cause of
action via the covenant-release distinction; a release is no longer a general discharge of liability unless the release so provides.3 9 The former
importance of settlement terminology is thus obviated by the new act.
"Unless the Release so Provides"
Section 2(3) of the contribution act provides that the settling
tortfeasor is not entitled to contribution from nonsettling tortfeasors
unless the release extinguishes the common liability among them."
Thus, it is critical that the terms of the release reflect the settling defendant's intention to protect his right to seek contribution. 41 Naming
the nonsettling defendant in an out of court settlement, as one intended
42
by the parties to be released, will extinguish that individual's liability.
Is it necessary, however, to actually name the nonsettling defendant to
discharge him?
In an action involving a nonsettling tortfeasor, appealing from
a ruling ordering contribution to a settling tortfeasor, the court, in
Hodges v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., held that
[i]f appellant's view were sound, we would have to read this requirement of the Act [that a third party is not released unless it
is so provided] to be "does not discharge the other tortfeasors
unless the release so provides by specifically naming the other
tortfeasor. . .

."

We think a release can "so provide" without

so naming the other tortfeasors.

....

43

35. 86 Nev. 347, 469 P.2d 57 (1970).
36. Id. at 350, 469 P.2d at 59.
37. Id. at 352, 469 P.2d at 60 (concurring opinion).
38. Id.
39. Nv. REv. STAT. § 17.230(1) (Supp. 1971).
40. Id. § 17.210(3).
41. A contribution action may be brought either in the original suit against the
nonsettling defendant or in a separate action subsequent to the discharge of the
common liability. Id. § 17.270(1) (2).
42. Cf., id., § 17.230(1).
43. 91 A.2d 473, 476 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1952) (construing the 1939 Uniform Act
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The release in Hodges provided for the discharge of the settling tortfeasor and "'all other persons, firms, and corporations, both known
and unknown' .
This was deemed sufficient to release all other
joint tortfeasors under the 1939 Uniform Act. 4 ' Similar decisions have
been reached in other jurisdictions adopting the contribution act.4 6 The
court in Peters v. Butler determined that a general release to "all mankind" barred any further actions against any person responsible for the
injury to the plaintiff. 47 Should Nevada interpret section 4(1) in conformity with other jurisdictions which have adopted similar contribution
provisions, it will adopt the view that a release is sufficient to discharge
a defendant even though the released party was not named if the terms
of the release indicate an intention to extinguish the defendants' common liability.
Another issue respecting the effect of releases which is raised
by the Nevada contribution act concerns the situation in which plaintiff
obtains judgment against a nonsettling tortfeasor for less than the
consideration paid to him by a settling joint tortfeasor. There is authority in several jurisdictions for the view that a release is evidence
that the settlement constituted full satisfaction of the claim and that
plaintiff takes nothing additional via a judgment which is less than the
amount of the settlement. 48 This was the conclusion reached in Raughley v. Delaware Coach Co.49 where the court held that the nonsettling
defendant had the right to plead a release given to a joint tortfeasor as a
complete defense since
[t]he jury may find that the plaintiff's damages do not exceed
$20,000 [the amount of consideration paid for the release] ....
The release, therefore, may constitute a complete defense .... 50
"..."I'

A provision in the release reciting that the settlement constitutes a
settlement in full is not, however, necessarily sufficient to extinguish
liability of the nonsettling parties and thus would not be sufficient to
support a subsequent contribution claim by the settling defendant."
The Nevada practitioner should therefore include a discharge recital of
each defendant's common liability to insure that the settling tortfeasor,
as codified in Maryland); accord, Morrison v. General Motors Corp., 428 F.2d
952 (Sth Cir. 1970).
44. 91 A.2d at 476.
45. Id.
46. Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 932 (1959); Canillas v. Joseph H. Carter, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(construing Massachusetts law).
47. 253 Md. 7, 8, 251 A.2d 600, 602 (1969).
48. E.g., Daugherty v. Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956).
49. 47 Del. 343, 91 A.2d 245 (1952).
50. Id. at 350, 91 A.2d at 248.
51. Allbright Bros. v. Hull-Dobbs Co., 209 F.2d 103, 104 (6th Cir. 1953).
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whom he represents, may maintain his claim for contribution against
nonsettling tortfeasors.
Statutory Conflict
The differences between the obligations act and Nevada's new
contribution act are particularly important because the obligations act
has been neither repealed nor modified by the legislature. As already
noted, a release under the obligations act discharges all tortfeasors
jointly and severally liable.12 A release under the contribution act,
however, does not release a nonsettling defendant unless it is so provided.5"
Hence, a statutory conflict has arisen with the passage of the contribution act. By enacting the contribution act without modifying the obligation act, the Nevada legislature has provided two conflicting provisions, each purporting to regulate the effect of a release on nonsettling
third party tortfeasors.
The necessity for modifying the obligations act was recognized by
the commissioners of the 1939 Uniform Contribution Act.54 They recommended that those states adopting the obligations act amend its provisions to make clear that the term "obligor" does not include persons
liable in tort and that the term "obligee" does not include persons possessing causes of action in tort. 55 As this modification of the obligations
act has not been enacted, Nevada practitioners are faced with a perplexing problem: which law should the parties look to in determining
rights and liabilities under the terms of a release in a tort action?
A logical solution was suggested in Nordyke v. Pastrell.5 6 In
Nordyke the Nevada court suggested that "[w]hen two statutes are so
repugnant that both cannot be executed, it is the rule that the latest [enactment] will control." 7 The court also determined that there is a presumption against repeal by implication, and therefore the conflicting
statutes should be reconciled if possible.58 This position was partially
based on the holding in State ex rel. Pyne v. La Grave 9 in which the
court recognized a presumption that the legislature intended for the
latest statute to control when an irreconcilable conflict arose.6 These
52. See notes 31-32 & accompanying text supra.
53. See notes 28-30 & accompanying text supra.
54. 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 232 (Commissioners' Note) (1957).
55. Id.
56. 54 Nev. 98, 7 P.2d 598 (1932).
57. Id. at 107, 7 P.2d at 600; accord, Presson v. Presson, 38 Nev. 203, 147 P.
1081 (1915); State ex rel. Pacific Reclamation Co. v. Ducker, 35 Nev. 214, 127 P.
990 (1912).
58. 54 Nev. at 105, 7 P.2d at 599.
59. 23 Nev. 25, 41 P. 1075 (1895).
60. Id. at 28, 41 P. at 1076; accord, Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Neb. 77, 177 P.2d
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cases indicate that the most reasonable solution to the contradicting
statutes would be to determine that the obligations act is repealed by
implication to the extent that it would no longer apply to torts or tortfeasors as recommended by the commissioners of the 1939 Uniform
Contribution Act. 6 '

Right of a Settling Tortfeasor to Be Free from
Subsequent Contribution Claims
Upon being released from liability, the settling tortfeasor must be
concerned with future claims of contribution against him. These claims
may, under some circumstances, be asserted by a nonsettling
tort62
feasor if he has been forced to satisfy a subsequent judgment.
Section 4(2) of the contribution act is directed to this problem.
It provides in part:
The release of one joint tortfeasor. . . does not relieve him from
liability for contribution. . unless the release provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of the released joint
tortfeasor, of the injured person's
damages recoverable against
63
all the other joint tortfeasors.
This subsection was adopted directly from section 5 of the 1939 Uniform Act. 64 The commissioners' note to that section documents its
purpose as the prevention of collusive agreements between plaintiff
and one of several tortfeasors:
[A]n injured person, acting in collusion with or out of sympathy
for one of the tortfeasors, cannot relieve him from the obligation to contribute to the other tortfeasors by releasing him. The
only way in which such a release can free the released tortfeasor
from his duty to contribute is to include a provision to the effect
that [the liability of the other tortfeasor shall be reduced by the
settling tortfeasor's pro rata share]. 65
Collusive agreements typically involve the plaintiff promising not to
seek satisfaction from one of two joint tortfeasors if the tortfeasor
agrees not to attempt to minimize plaintiff's recovery in any subsequent
action brought by plaintiff against the two joint defendants. 66 These
types of agreements would serve the settling parties no practical -use
677 (1947); Ronnow v. City of Las Vegas, 57 Neb. 332, 65 P.2d 133 (1937); Estate
of Walley, 11 Nev. 260 (1876).
61. 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 232 (Commissioners' Note) (1957).
62. See, Garrison v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 74 N.M. 238, 242, 392 P.2d 580,
583 (1964).
63. NEv. Rnv. STAT. § 17.230(2) (1971).
64. 9 UNwOn_ Lws ANN. 245 (1957).
65. Id. at 245 (Commissioners' Note).
66. See Ponderosa Timber & Clearing Co. v. Emrich, 86 Nev. -, 472 P.2d 358
(1970).
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under the new act since the settling defendant would still be liable
for contribution unless the agreement contained a pro rata reduction
clause. The inclusion of such a clause would be unacceptable to plaintiff since any benefit he would otherwise receive from collusion would
be vitiated by a reduction of his recovery from the nonsettling defendant.
Assume that plaintiff settles with A (one of two joint tortfeasors)
for $5,000 on a claim for injuries sustained in an automobile collision.
If the release does not provide for the discharge of B (the other tortfeasor), then the injured party is free to pursue an action against him.
For example, if the resulting verdict awards the plaintiff $25,000 the
court will credit the verdict with the $5,000 consideration the plaintiff
received from A in settlement and enter a judgment for $20,000. A
would then be potentially liable in contribution to B for $7,500. That
is, A is responsible for his pro rata share of one-half of the common
liability of $25,000, absent a provision determining the relative fault
of each tortfeasor. This is reduced by the $5,000 A has already paid
to the plaintiff. 67 If A wishes to protect himself from contribution claims,
his release must contain the provision for a pro rata reduction of the
damages. This provision must provide that any damages recovered by
plaintiff against a nonsettling tortfeasor would be reduced by the settling tortfeasor's pro rata share. 68 If the release embodied such a provision in the foregoing example, a $25,000 judgment against A
and B, after A's release, would result in a reduction of $12,500 of B's
ultimate liability. B would then have no right to seek contribution from
A.
Accordingly, without a pro rata reduction provision in the release,
the plaintiff would recover $25,000-consideration for the release plus
the amount of the judgment. With the inclusion of a pro rata provision, the plaintiff would be entitled to only $17,500-consideration
for the release plus the judgment after it is reduced by the settling
defendant's pro rata share. The propriety of section 4(2) has been the
subject of continuing controversy in the states which have adopted similar provisions.6 9
Arguments in favor of this provision include the elimination of
collusive agreements between plaintiff and one defendant to the detriment of a co-defendant. The injustice of such collusive agreements was
exemplified by Ponderosa Timber & Clearing Co. v. Emrich.70 In that
67. If the judgment against B is for $10,000 or less, then B would not have
any claim for contribution. That is, A's pro rata share would be $5,000 (one-half of
the judgment) which he already satisfied in consideration for the release.
68. NEv. REV. STAT. § 17.230(2) (1971).
69. See generally Note, Joint Tortfeasors-Contribution-Effectsof Statute on
Covenant not to Sue, 35 N.C.L. Rav. 141 (1956); 55 MicH. L. REv. 1200 (1957).
70. 86 Nev. 625, 472 P.2d 358 (1970).
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case the plaintiff, Emrich, struck an agreement with the insurance carrier
of one of several joint tortfeasors. The agreement guaranteed the plaintiff a recovery of $20,000. If the judgment against the multiple defendants exceeded $20,000, the plaintiff agreed not to-look to the settling
defendant for satisfaction of the judgment. The defendant would thereby
benefit if the judgment exceeded $20,000. To benefit from the terms
of the agreement, defendant's counsel's arguments to the jury were calculated to maximize the plaintiff's recovery rather than to minimize the
verdict in the usual fashion. 71 The court in Ponderosa permitted the
agreement to stand.72
Under the contribution act, these agreements could not benefit setling joint tortfeasors since nonsettling defendants could look to the
settling defendant for contribution. Under the facts of Ponderosa,
for example, the defendant who was party to the collusive agreement
would be liable along with the other two defendants in contribution for
his pro rata share of plaintiff's recovery of $35,000. The usefulness of
such collusive settlements is thus obviated by section 4(2) of the new
contribution act.
The validity of the Ponderosa-typecollusive agreements in Nevada,
absent section 4(2), was already jeopardized in the decision of Lum v.
Stinnett.73 Lum was an action against three doctors involving alleged
negligence in failing to discover and treat a compression fracture in the
spine of the plaintiff. 74 An agreement, similar to that found in Ponderosa, was made between the insurance carriers of two defendant doctors and the plaintiff. 75 The court held that the agreement was "champertous"176 and violative of Nevada statutes binding members of the
Nevada bar to rules of professional conduct.77 In distinguishing this
case from Ponderosa, the court determined that the validity of the agreement was not in issue in Ponderosa and that Ponderosawas not therefore overruled by the Lum decision. 7 s Lum went far in protecting
71. ld. at 629-31, 472 P.2d at 361 (dissenting opinion).
72. Id. at 627 n.1, 472 P.2d at 360 n.1.
73. 87 Nev.-, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
74. Id. at--, 488 P.2d at 348.
75. Id.
76. Id. at -, 488 P.2d at 350. In the 14th and 15th centuries, champertous
agreements were lawful. Parties would often assign their claims to men of wealth
and reputation under an agreement by which the assignee would prosecute the claim in
exchange for a percentage of the recovery. Such claims usually involved fraud or
were of a dubious nature. Assignees could then use their influence in the legal
structure to obtain a favorable result. These types of agreements were outlawed in
the later stages of the common law and are largely controlled today by statute.
6 A. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1422, at 360-61 (1962).
77. 87 Nev. -, 488 P.2d at 352.
78. ld. at -, 488 P.2d at 352 n.7.
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the unwary nonsettling defendant from collusive settlements resulting in
one or more defendants satisfying an unequally high share of a judgment.
Despite these advantages, section 4(2) has been found unworkable
in other jurisdictions. 9 According to the commissioners of the 1939
Uniform Act, section 5 of that act (which reads the same as section 4(2)
of the Nevada act) was "one of the chief causes for complaint where
the Act has been adopted, and one of the main objections to its adoption." 80 Section 5 was intended to prevent plaintiff from discharging
one defendant for a nominal consideration or, in the case of collusion,
to prevent the settling defendant from promising to remain in the trial
without striving to minimize the verdict. Either of these situations
could result in a nonsettling defendant incurring disproportionate liability without the right of contribution. 8 1
With respect to the impracticability of the provision, it has been
noted that:
[tihe effect of Section 5 . . . has been to discourage settlements
in joint tort cases, by making it impossible for one tortfeasor
alone to take a release and close the file. Plaintiff's attorneys
are said to refuse to accept any release which contains [the reduction provisions] . . . because they have no way of knowing
what they are giving up. The "pro rata share" cannot be determined in advance of judgment against the other tortfeasors.
. . . No defendant wants to settle when he remains open to contribution in an uncertain amount, to be determined on the basis
of a judgment against another in a suit to which he [is not] a
party. 82
An examination of the earlier example will best illustrate the statute's deleterious effect on the parties' willingness to settle. Assume
plaintiff releases joint tortfeasor A for $5,000, and the release contains
a clause providing for the reduction of a subsequent verdict against joint
tortfeasor B by A's pro rata share. Plaintiff then wins a verdict of $25,000 against B. As already noted, the verdict is reduced to $12,500
since the other $12,500 representing A's pro rata share has already
been bargained away by plaintiff. As a result, plaintiff must settle for a
total recovery of $17,500 even though the trier of fact awarded him $25,000. On the other hand, if A accepted the release from plaintiff without
a reduction provision he would be potentially liable to B for $7,500
which is one-half of the common liability reduced by the $5,000 plaintiff
received from A in settlement.8 3 Thus both A and B would pay $12,500
even though A had accepted his liability, made an out of court settlement,
and relieved plaintiff and the judicial system of the burdens of litigation.
79.

9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 132 (Commissioners' Note) (Supp. 1967).

80.

Id.
9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 245 (Commissioners' Note) (1957).

81.
82.
83.

Id. at 132-33 (Supp. 1967).
See notes 67-68 & accompanying text supra.
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The inequity of this result, and its effects upon the likelihood of
settlement, was recognized in Judge Musmanno's dissenting opinion in
84
Daugherty v. Hershberger.
The case involved multiple plaintiffs
who released one joint tortfeasor with a release containing a pro rata
reduction clause. 85 The settlement money was divided among the
claimants based on their individual losses. Subsequently, the plaintiffs
obtained a verdict against the nonsettling tortfeasor. Instead of reducing the verdict by settling defendant's pro rata share, the court deducted
the settlement payments made by the released tortfeasor to the plaintiffs which as to some plaintiffs exceeded the verdict awarded them by
the jury."6 As a result, the nonsettling defendant paid almost $12,000
less than the settling defendant. 87 Judge Musmanno's dissent underscored the inequity of this result asserting that from a policy standpoint,
the court's decision favored a nonsettling tortfeasor over the settling
88
one.
Because of the inequities thus produced, section 5 was eliminated
in the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,8 9 a revision
of the 1939 act." The new act substituted a subsection providing that
any covenant or release given in "good faith" relieved the settling
defendant from any claims of contribution."' The commissioners to
the 1955 act believed that
tt]he requirement that the release or covenant be given in good
faith gives the court occasion to determine whether the transaction
was collusive, and if so there is no discharge [from a claim of
contribution]. 92
This new proviso was criticized on the grounds that a collusive
plaintiff and defendant could settle for a sum well below the settling defendant's share of the liability and still be considered within the area of
84. 386 Pa. 367, 375, 126 A.2d 730, 734 (1956).
85. Id. at 370, 126 A.2d at 732.
86. Id. at 370-71, 126 A.2d at 732.
87. In a subsequent action, the released tortfeasor sought contribution from the
nonsettling tortfeasor for $4,021.23 representing the difference between the latters' pro
rata share of the verdict and the reduced amount for which judgment was entered.
The court allowed contribution even though the release did not extinguish the nonsettling tortfeasor's liability to the injured party which the 1939 Uniform Act as codified in Pennsylvania requires as a condition precedent. As the opinion states, "With
equity the keynote of the doctrine of contribution, the Act . . . must be examined
with equity in mind, for it is clearly inequitable to exonerate [the nonsettling tortfeasor]
at the expense of [the released tortfeasorl." Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Super.
68, 72, 186 A.2d 427, 429 (1962).
88. 386 Pa. at 377, 126 A.2d at 735 (dissenting opinion).
89. See 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 125 (Supp. 1967).
90. Id. at 125-26.
91. Id. at 132.
92. Id. (Commissioners' Note).
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"good faith, '9 3 and the settling defendant could thereby escape liability
for a contribution claim. Since the 1939 act and the Nevada contribution act do not consider the "good faith" of a tortfeasor in determining
his liability for contribution, 94 the settling defendant in Nevada cannot
defeat contribution by a showing of good faith.
Liability for contribution can only be defeated if the settling defendant can show the existence of a pro rata reduction clause in the settlement agreement.9 5 The
possibility of one tortfeasor satisfying a disproportionate percentage of
the damages is remote since the absence of a reduction clause permits a
nonsettling defendant to enforce contribution, while the presence of a reduction clause results in the diminution of damages by the settling
party's pro rata share.90 The 1955 Uniform Act, however, permits
the possibility that a nonsettling defendant could be forced to satisfy
more than his share of the damages, with no contribution right, if the
trier of fact is satisfied that the settling parties entered into the out of
court settlement in "good faith."9 7 It is reasonable to conclude that
the 1955 act will do less to prevent collusive side agreements, but substantially more to encourage out of court settlements with a single tortfeasor. Parties entering into settlement under the revised contribution act
will not be faced with the dilemma of whether or not to include a pro
rata reduction clause in the agreement.
The New York Law Revision Commission favored the 1939 pro
rata reduction provision. 98 In its report it explained that
[o]bjection to this requirement [of providing for reduction of
damages by the pro rata share] has been made on the ground that
it would make it difficult for one of several tort-feasors to obtain a
separate settlement. But this would be true only where a release
was sought for a nominal consideration or a payment substantially
less than the pro rata share. ....
9.
This view is not consistent with the Nevada contribution act, however,
which defines the "pro rata
share" on the basis of each tortfeasor's "rel10 0
ative degrees of fault."'
"Relative Fault"
Four states, not including Nevada, adopting the 1939 Uniform Act
93. Note, Torts-Contribution-Effect of Insolvency and/or Settlement of One or
More Joint Tortfeasors, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 533, 537 (1958).
94. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 132 (Commissioners' Note) (Supp. 1967).
95. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 245 (1957).

96.
97.

Id.
Id.at 132 (Supp. 1967).

98.

NEw YoRK LAw REVISION COMM. REPORT 31 (1952).

99. Id.
100. Nav. REv.

STAT.

§ 17.280(2) (Supp. 1971).
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use relativefault as a basis for apportioning liability among tortfeasors.' 0
The new Nevada provision was -adopted in part from an optional section
of the 1939 Uniform Act. The provision, section 9(2) of the Nevada
act, states in part:
The relative degrees of fault shall be determined so that no joint
tortfeasor shall be called upon to bear more than his share of
the liability as between the joint tortfeasors .... 102
Section 9(2) of the Nevada contribution act goes beyond the uniform
act in that it requires a determination of the relative degree of fault for
all contribution cases, while the 1939 Uniform Act required the determination of relative fault only in those cases where there was "such a
disproportion of fault. . . as to render inequitable an equal distribution." The relative fault provision of the uniform act was eliminated
by the commissioners in 1955.103 Comparative negligence was considered an undesirable alternative since apportionment of ordinary
acts of negligence leading to a single injury would not necessarily produce a just result.'0 4 The indivisibility of a single injury and the lack
of any definite basis for apportionment could place too heavy a burden
upon the finder of fact.10 5
The relative fault provision, adopted by the Nevada legislature,
will probably create several serious problems. One difficulty concerns
the pro rata reduction requirements of section 4(2) previously discussed.' 0 6
If a release must provide for a pro rata reduction of the injured person's damages to protect a settling tortfeasor from contribution claims,
the settling plaintiff will be faced with an inquiry into the relative fault
of the multiple tortfeasors before undertaking settlement. To illustrate, if plaintiff exacts payment from A in settlement of his claim and in
consideration for the release provides for a pro rata reduction of his damages, he cannot know by what percentage his verdict against joint
tortfeasor B will be reduced. If the plaintiff believes that A is 40 percent
to blame and settles accordingly, but the jury determines that A is
70 percent at fault, the plaintiffs verdict against tortfeasor B will be
reduced by more than he anticipated. On a $10,000 verdict, plaintiff
would recover only $3,000 from B instead of the $6,000 he envisioned.
If plaintiff is hesitant to include a pro rata reduction in the release knowing that his damages will be reduced by a mathematical division based
on the number of tortfeasors, he would be even more hesitant to settle
101.
UNwoaM
102.
103.
104.

105.
106.

Included are Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, and South Dakota.
LAws ANN. 129 (Supp. 1967).
NEv. REv. STAT. § 17.280(2) (Supp. 1971).
9 UNIFoRm LAWS ANN. 129 (Supp. 1967).
See id. (Commissioners' Note).
See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 434-35 (4th ed. 1971).
See notes 62-66 & accompanying text supra.

See 9
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if he knows that the reduction of these damages will depend upon an unknown quantity-the determination of relative fault by the trier of fact.
Plaintiff would hesitate to settle with one tortfeasor except in cases in
which the evidence substantiated that the settling tortfeasor contributed
in a very small degree to the plaintiff's injuries, or where the consideration for the release was so significant that it approached full satisfaction
of his claim. In the application of relative fault, the plaintiff will need
to prognosticate about how the finder of fact will apportion plaintiff's
damages among the several joint tortfeasors. On the other hand, if the
release does not provide for a pro rata reduction, either tortfeasor may
commence a contribution claim against the other on the belief that
his degree of liability 7 was less than the percentage of the judgment he
1
was forced to satisfy. '
In Bielski v. Schulze'0 the Wisconsin Supreme Court evaluated
the effects of relative fault upon joint tortfeasors. The court predictably concluded that a defendant whose fault was greater than 50 percent
should be more willing to contribute a greater proportion to settlement,
while the less responsible defendant should settle for a sum commensurate with his lower percentage of fault.' ° " The court did not consider,
however, the proper standards to guide a defendant in contributing his
"fair" share toward settlement.
The only standard applicable is the discretion of the trier of
fact; it is the function of the trier of fact to determine the relative degree
of fault. 1 ° The Hawaii Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Branch determined
that it was a jury function to decide the degree of liability attributable to
each tortfeasor if the court first determines that there is a disproportion
of fault."' The court concluded that "the most culpable party should
sustain that share of the loss which is commensurate with his degree of
fault.""' 2 Since determination of culpability is within the province of
the trier
of fact,"' so also is determination of the degree of culpabil114
ity.
107. See Mitchell v. Branch, 45 Hawaii 128, 363 P.2d 969 (1961). Suppose A
settles with an injured claimant for $5,000 in exchange for a release which does not
contain a pro rata reduction clause. Subsequently, claimant institutes an action
against joint tortfeasor B. The jury determines that B was 10% at fault. Judgment
is entered for $10,000 which B satisfies. A would be liable to B for $9,000 in contribution since A was determined to be 90% at fault and is thus liable for a similar
percentage of the damages.
108. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
109. Id. at 12-13, 114 N.W.2d at 111.
110. Paclawski v. Bristol Laboratories, Inc., 425 P.2d 452 (Okla. 1967) (construing Arkansas law).
111. 45 Hawaii 128, 142, 363 P.2d 969, 978 (1961).
112. Id. at 141, 363 P.2d at 978.
113. Id. at 142, 363 P.2d at 978.
114. Id. See Little v. Miles, 213 Ark. 725, 212 S.W.2d 935 (1948).
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The settling tortfeasor and the injured party are therefore placed
in guarded positions. The settling defendant must include a pro rata
reduction clause to protect himself from future contribution claims which
could cause him to incur a disproportionate share of the damages. Accordingly, the injured party may defeat his own right to full settlement
of his claim by agreeing to a reduction clause in the release without first
considering the ramifications of such a provision. If the trier of fact
determines the relative degree of fault of the settling defendant to be
substantially more than anticipated by the plaintiff, damages recoverable against the nonsettling defendant will be reduced accordingly, with
the result that plaintiff will recover less by having settled than if he had
permitted the case against both defendants to proceed to trial.
There is little doubt that the relative degree of fault doctrine is
more equitable in its distribution of liability. It is equally certain, however, that parties will be more adverse to prospective settlement unless
they are reasonably sure that the end result will not be detrimental to their
respective interests. Relative fault, and its concomitant disquieting
effect upon the expectations of prospective settling parties, will stand as
an obstacle to pretrial settlement of tort claims against joint tortfeasors.
Joinder of Settling Defendant at Trial
An important issue raised by reduction of plaintiff's claim by a pro
rata share upon settlement with one joint tortfeasor concerns the right of
the nonsettling tortfeasor to join the settling tortfeasor as a third party
defendant. The purpose of joinder of the settling defendant would be
to establish him as a joint tortfeasor and thus establish that the pro rata
reduction clause, given in a release to the settling tortfeasor, applies to
permit reduction of the nonsettling defendant's liability.
In Davis v. Miller"15 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined
that a tortfeasor released by the injured party and the nonsettling defendant to the action could still be joined as a third party defendant. 116 The
case involved a negligence action stemming from an automobile collision. Since the possibility existed that the settling tortfeasor would
be liable to both the nonsettling tortfeasor and the plaintiff, settlement was effected with both parties. 17 The nonsettling defendant
was deemed by the court to have a special interest in retaining the
settling defendant at trial since his damages would be reduced if
the trier of fact determined that the two defendants were joint tort115. 385 Pa. 348, 123 A.2d 422 (1956).
116. Id. at 351, 123 A.2d at 424. The court based its decision on section 5 of
the 1939 Uniform Act as codified in Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2086 (1967).
This section is substantially the same as section 4(2) of the Nevada Contribution Act.
117. 385 Pa. at 350, 123 A.2d at 423.
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Although the release held by the settling tortfeasor in

Davis did not release the nonsettling defendant, it did provide for a pro
rata reduction of plaintiff's damages and thereby protected the settling
tortfeasor from a contribution claim. The court nonetheless permitted
joinder." 9 Moreover, the decision maintained that pro rata reduction of
the plaintiff's damages necessitated that the released party be determined
to be a joint tortfeasor before the nonsettling defendant could benefit
from the reduction clause. If the released party was determined not to be
a joint tortfeasor, "the releases given her by plaintiffs would not inure
to . .. [the nonsettling defendant's] benefit.' 2 The court concluded
that although the party defendant had no right to recover contribution
from the settling defendant, he did
have an extremely valuable right in retaining her in the case, because, if the jury should find her to be a joint tortfeasor, his liability to plaintiffs would be cut in half. Her continuance in the
121
case is therefore necessary ....

Under the holding in Davis there is no automatic reduction of the
plaintiff's damages simply because the party defendant alleges the ex122
istence of a pro rata reduction release given to the settling defendant.
The defendant must prove that the settling tortfeasor was in fact a joint
tortfeasor. If this requirement necessitates the joining of the released
defendant, the court will permit such joinder.
There are few cases deciding the issue of joinder in those states
which have enacted the equivalent of section 4(2) of the Nevada contribution act. In Swigert v. Welk 1 23 the Maryland Supreme Court
reached the same conclusion as the court in Davis; it held that the party
defendant had the right to have the released defendant before the
court. The court also determined, however, that whether the released
defendant
actively participated in the trial was a matter left to his dis1 24
cretion.

If the results of Davis and Swigert are followed by the Nevada
courts, nonsettling defendants face an onerous burden. By failing to
prove that the released defendant was a joint tortfeasor, the nonsettling defendant becomes subject to the plaintiff's entire claim for damages. He has no recourse against the released defendant since he cannot obtain contribution unless the settling defendant has been legally
determined by the trier of fact to be jointly and severally liable. 25
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 352, 123 A.2d at 424.
Id.
Id.
Id.

122.

Id.

123.

213 Md. 613, 133 A.2d 428 (1957).

124.

Id. at 622, 133 A.2d at 433.

125.

See Davis v. Miller, 385 Pa. 348, 352, 123 A.2d 422, 424 (1956).
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If this view is adopted, the effect of joinder will be substantial in
Nevada in view of the requirement that the defendants' relative degrees
of fault need be determined. 2 6 That is, since the plaintiff will be attempting to maximize his recovery by maximizing the nonsettling defendant's degree of fault, it will be beneficial for the party defendant to
join the released defendant in order to shift the relative quantum of liability to the released defendant, thereby reducing his own share of liability. The defendant who does not join the released tortfeasor may find
himself unable to challenge a finding of fact that the nonsettling defendant is solely responsible--a result which would force
the nonsettling
127
party defendant to satisfy the judgment in its entirety.
Conclusion
The Nevada contribution act now gives parties contracting a
release the ability to control the extent to which liability is extinguished
by the agreement. 1 28 No longer does a release automatically discharge
the common liability of*the joint defendants unless the parties to the
agreement so provide.'2 9 This change should prevent plaintiff from
inadvertently releasing a party who gave nothing in settlement. Nevertheless, the Nevada courts must resolve the statutory conflict between the existing obligations act and the contribution act. 3 0 If the obligations act is partially repealed by implication, the parties to a tort
action may safely settle with the knowledge that the injured party may
retain his cause of action against a nonsettling defendant.' 3 ' Moreover,
if the plaintiff agrees to extinguish the common liability by providing a
discharge recital in the release, the settling defendant has the right of
contribution against other joint tortfeasors. 3 2
While the act preserves plaintiffs cause of action against a nonsettling defendant, the settling tortfeasor is not protected from a subsequent contribution claim unless the release contains a pro rata reduction clause.' 33 Since the presence or absence of a reduction clause may
be unacceptable to one or all of the parties, out of court settlement is
made more difficult. The plaintiff could give up a substantial part of
his damages by agreeing to a pro rata reduction,'3 4 while the defend126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
supra.
133.
134.

See text accompanying notes 105-07 supra.
Mazer v. Lipshutz, 360 F.2d 275, 279-80 (3d Cir. 1966).
See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
See note 27 & accompanying text supra.
See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
NEv. REv. STAT. § 17.210(3) (1971). See note 41 & accompanying text
NEv. REv.STAT. § 17.230(2) (1971).
See notes 67-68 & accompanying text supra.
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ant would gain little from settlement without the inclusion of a reduction clause. 135
In construing the effect of a pro rata reduction, the parties must
look to section 9(2) of the act containing the "relative fault" provision.13 6 Although it is more equitable to permit greater liability to rest
with the greater degree of fault, the new provision will have the effect
of making settlement less desirable. Plaintiff will be reluctant to include
a pro rata reduction clause in the release since the amount of reduction
of damages will depend upon the relative degree of fault assigned to each
tortfeasor by the trier of fact."' The plaintiff must prognosticate with
respect to the degree of fault among the defendants before entering settlement with a tortfeasor; the risk of plaintiff's misapportionment of
relative fault will make him less willing to enter into settlement.
Though a settling tortfeasor may protect himself from contribution
via pro rata reduction, he may nevertheless be subject to impleading by
the codefendant. Davis v. Miller stands for the proposition that joinder
is necessary because the verdict cannot be reduced by the settling defendant's pro rata share unless the party defendant can prove that the
settling defendant is a joint tortfeasor."5a
With the enactment of the contribution act, no longer will one defendant be required to bear a grossly disproportionate share of plaintiff's
claim. The act may adversely affect, however, the ability of the parties
to undertake successful settlement. If this effect is forthcoming, as this
prospective analysis indicates that it may be, the deleterious effect of
Nevada's contribution act may outweigh its benefits.
Gary D. Samson*

135.

Id.

136. NEv. REv.STAT. § 17.280(2) (Supp. 1971).
137. See note 111 & accompanying text supra.
138. 385 Pa. 348, 352, 123 A.2d 422, 424 (1956).

*

Member, Second Year Class

